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ABSTRACT 
Moral development has been conceptualized in terms of simple and 
complex stage models. This study was aimed at comparing and evaluating 
these two models to determine which most adequately addresses the 
construct. Seventy college undergraduates were administered the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) as a measure of moral reasoning. An analysis 
of their DIT protocols for response variation showed that a full range 
of reasoning was used to address each moral situation, supporting a 
complex stage orientation. This study was also designed to explore 
personal/situational factors which contribute to this variability in 
reasonfog. Fifteen of the original 70 subjects were used for a 
follow-up interview. This revealed that severity of story consequences 
and personal relevance of the story theme were significant contributors 
to response variation. A complex stage orientation seems to be the 
most adequate way to conceptualize moral development, due to the degree 
of stage mixture noted in this study. This study revealed, however, 
that numerous methodological considerations need to be resolved before 
we can implement the complex stage mo~el in the assessment of moral 
reasoning and design of moral education programs. 
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Statement Of The Problem 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1958) has proposed a structural developmental 
theory to account for moral development from childhood through 
adulthood. It is largely based on Piaget's model of moral development, 
however, Kohlberg claims that his theory is more adequate because {a) 
it accounts for 1 ife span develoJJTlent rather than stopping at early 
adolescence, and (b) he takes a stronger stance regarding the 
stage-like nature of his moral judgment sequence (Damon, 1980). Rest 
(1979) has developed a theory of moral development which is based 
largely on Kohlberg's paradigm. He extends Kohlberg's "simple stage 11 
approach, however, to include more complex stage mixture. 
The following review of the literature will examine Kohlberg's 
structural theory (i.e., his model of stage develoJlllent). In addition, 
Kohlberg's "simple stage" model will be compared to Rest's "complex 
stage" orientation. 
This study will document the degree of stage mixture across and 
within subjects. A large degree of stage mixture will indicate support 
for a complex stage model. In addition, this study will explore 
possible factors which could account for stage mixture. Also, evidence 
of post conventional reasoning will be documented in terms of a complex 
stage orientation, and methodological considerations in using Rest's 
method of assessment will be examined. 
Structural Theory 
Structuralism is a theoretical orientation which conceptualizes 
development in terms of an invariant sequence of discrete and 
• 
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discontinuous stages or levels (Flavell, 1963). Each stage is 
internally consistent and qualitatively different from all other 
stages, and development is hierarchical as each successive stage in the 
sequence logically subsumes all lower stages (Rest, 1973). In 
addition, Gibbs (1977) suggests that successive stages of development 
are more adaptive with respect to human functioning, thus we should 
expect similar developmental patterns across cultures. 
Structured Whole 
Classifying development in terms of stages or levels is a means·of 
organizing behavior according to discrete categories where each stage 
is internally consistent in terms of its unique logic. The logic 
within stages is internally consistent and qualitatively different from 
al 1 other stages. This means that on~ 1 s approach or response to 
various situations should reflect an orientation which is unified under 
a set of principles or rules for that stage. This response 
generalization, or unification of responses across diverse situations 
is referred to by Piaget as "structure d' ensemble" (Flavell, 1963). 
Liebert (1978) suggests that, 
The concept of stages or levels of moral development 
implies that at any particular time in an individual's 
life one can find an organized system of feelings and 
beliefs that direct the individual's moral thought and 
action so as to produce similar responses to diverse 
situations (p. 8). 
Invariant Sequence 
Developmental progress, the move from ont stage to the next, is 
marked by a consecutive, gradual, upward movement hrough the stage 
sequence. Each major reorganization in the course of development 
represents a new stage. The sequence, or particular order of stage 
acquisition, is invari..ant as development precedes one stage at a time, 
no stages are skipped, and there i s resistance to extinction or 
regression (Gibbs, 1977). 
Hierarchical Development 
Each succeeding stage in the sequence represents an advance over 
previous stages as all the elements of the old stage are transformed 
and reorganized with new elements to form a more differentiated and 
integrated structure. The higher stage is more complex and adaptive as 
individuals are capable of using all lower stages as well as their 
present stage (Rest, 1973). The adaptive nature of development 
suggests that similar developmental patterns should be prevalent among 
members of the human species regardless of culture or other 
environmental factors {Gibbs, 1977). Developmental progress may be a 
function of culture or other environmental influences but the basic 
pattern of development should be consistent within the species 
(naturalism) Liebert (1978) suggests, 
Just as well-watered and properly cared for plant will 
bear flowers and fruit sooner than one that is left to 
mature willy-nilly, so (according to structural 
theory) children may advance more or less quickly to 
mature thought depending on the degree to which their 
environments nurture cognitive and moral growth. But 
the tendency to blossom and to display distinctive 
characteristics in a fixed metamorphis is to be found 
within the nature of the biological unit and cannot be 
said to arise from or be caused by the environment 
( p. 15) • 
4 
Theoretical Conclusions 
According to structural theory we should expect to discover similar 
developmental patterns among all members of the species, while specific 
developmental progress remains a function of cultural or other 
environmental factors. This developmental pattern is organized in 
terms of an invariant sequence of stages, where each stage is 
organized according to its own logic. Thus, individuals occupying the 
same stage should exhibit similar types of reasoning and respond 
consistently across a variety of situations. Each successive stage in 
this sequence logically presupposes all previous stages and represents 
a more advanced fonn of developme.nt. 
Kohlberg has attempted to describe his model of moral development 
in terms of the structural approach reviewed above. The following 
discussion is a brief review of the major aspects of his structural 
theory. 
Kohlberg•s Structural Theory 
Kohlberg•s model covers the range of moral development from 
childhood through adulthood. His first level of development (stages 
one and two) is very similar to Piaget's description of early 
development, which includes children from ages 4 or 5 up to about 8 or 
9. Kohlberg•s later stages describe development beyond Piaget's 
highest stage, which extends only through early adolescence. Kohlberg 
believes that Piaget's stages are inadequately formulated 9 thus he has 
.subdivided and reorganized them to be better representations of true 
stages, and he has extended them to include more advanced-development 
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through adulthood (Damon, 1980). Thus, Kohlberg claims that his theory 
not only subsumes Piaget's stages of reasoning, but represents a 
refonnulated and extended version to comply more rigidly with the 
structural developmental approach and cover life span development. 
Six Stages Of Reasoning 
Kohlberg initially fonnulated his six stage model based on a study 
of boys ages 10, 13, and 16 (Kohlberg, 1958). He included adults in 
later studies and conducted a series of longitudinal studies on his 
original group which has led to many theoretical revisions. The six 
stages are organized in tenns of three levels; preconventional, 
conventional, and post conventional. 
Individuals at the preconventional level of development do not 
understand or respond to the rules or expectations of society. Rather, 
preconventional reasoners interpret rule-s on a literal level in defer-
ence to an authority figure such as a parent. Right and wrong is 
strictly detennined by whether one has obeyed or disobeyed these rules 
regardless of intent or the motives involved. Reasons for behavior at 
this level include self-interest, avoiding punishment, and deference to 
authority (Kohlberg, L., Colby, A., Gibbs, J., & Speicher-Dubin, B., 
1976). 
The preconventional level is subdivided into stages one and two. 
Stage one reason~rs obey rules for the primary purpose of avoiding 
aversive consequences, and stage two reasoners operate for persona 1 
gain (Kohlberg, et al, 1976). Kohlberg (1976) claims that most 
children under age 9 are at the preconventional level, as well as some 
· adolescents and adult criminal offenders. 
Most adolescents and adults, however, reason according to 
conventional morality (Kohlberg, et al, 1976). Conventional level 
reasoners (stages three and four) define right in terms of the rules, 
roles and expectations of society or smaller groups such as religious 
and political organizations. The main distinction between stages at 
the conventional level is that stage three reasoners apply their 
conventional thinking to interpersonal situations and stage four 
individuals respond to the entire social order (Damon, 1980). Stage 
three reasoners, for example, confonn to standards designed by others 
in pursuit of approval from these authority figures. Stage four 
reasoners, however, may confonn to social norms in order to gain 
acceptance as good citizens. Damon (1980) adds, "Justice as stage 
four, thus, becomes establishing good citizenship, working hard, and 
. maintaining the law of the land" (p. 42). 
6 
Post conventional reasoning (stages five and six) is the highest 
level in Kohlberg's paradigm. These individuals define right in terms 
of universal human rights, values and principles. They believe that it 
is usually right to uphold the law, however, violations of the law are 
justified when the law is not protecting human rights. In cases where 
principles come into conflict with so~iety•s rules the post convention-
al individual judges by principles rather than convention. 
Stage five reasoners, for example, conceive of morality in terms of 
a social contract, "he or she conceives of moral responsibility as 
binding upon all those who claim the rights of society" (Damon, 1980, 
p. 42). Individuals feel obligated to obey the law because they have 
created a social contract to make and abide by laws for the good of 
all, to protect their own rights and the rights of others. According 
7 
to Kohlberg, et al, (1976) .a social contract is equivalent to" ••• the 
notion that by living in society you have made a generalized commitment 
to respect and uphold the rights of other<; (and the laws this entails)" 
(p. 13). 
Stage six reasoners 4re guided by self chosen ethical principles 
which are universal for all humanity. 
Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid 
because they are based on such principles. When laws 
violate these principles one acts in accordance with 
the principle. Principles are universal principles of 
justice: The equality of human rights and respect for 
the dignity of human beings as individual persons 
(Kohlberg, et al, 1976, p. 20). 
Kohlberg believes that his six stage model of moral development 
fits well within the structural developmental approach outlined earlier 
(Damon, 1980). His theoretical notions of development can best be 
understood in terms of the simple stage model (Rest, 1979). 
The Simple Stage Model 
Figure 1 (see page 8) is a graphic presentation of the simple stage 
model representing the major theoretical aspects of development 
according to Kohlberg (Rest, 1979). 
Kohlberg suggests that individuals pass through alternate periods 
of transition and consolidation in the course of acquiring new modes of 
reasoning. Reasoners develop from a point of using one stage 
exclusively to using reasoning one stage above their dominant stage 
(+1) at increasing levels of frequency. The use of the +1 stage 
· continues to increase until the former stage is dropped completely and 
again one stage of reasoning is used exclusively. "Higher stages 
displace the structures found at lower stages" (Kohlberg, 1967, p. 32). 
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Thus, at times individuals utilize one stage exclusively after 
completely discarding the previous stage, and the +l stage is still out 
of reach. This is a period of maximum consolidation and no further 
development of that stage occurs (Rest, 1979). Each stage peaks at 
100% usage and has a turn at predominance in use over ·the other 
stages. In addition, the consolidation of successive stages is 
sequential. 
Stage theory holds that every single individual, 
studied longitudinally, should move only one step at a 
time through the stage sequence and always in the same 
order (p. 39). Stages imply distinct or qualitative 
differences in structure and the different structures 
fonn an invariant sequence (p. 32). (Kohhberg, et al, 
1976) 
The previous stage (-1) falls to 0% usage before the higher stage (+1) 
is ever used. 11Individuals should be consistently at a stage unless 
they are ,in transition to the next stage 11 -(Kohlberg, 1976, p. 47). -
This means that stage mixture is theoretically possible only between 
two adjacent stages (e.g., 2- 3 and 3-4 is possible but 2-3-4 or 2-4 
mixture is not possible). Individuals respond in a way characteristic 
of their stage, not in a manner more primitive or more mature 
(Bearison, 1974). 11There is a disposition to prefer a solution of a 
problem at the highest level available to him" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 
32). Kohlberg (1973) also adds: 
The stages form a clustered whole. There is a general 
factor of moral stage cross cutting all dilemnas, 
verbal or behavioral (p. 186). 
Each of these different and sequential modes of 
thought forms a structured whole - a given stage 
response on a task does not just represent a specific 
response rather it represents an underlying thought 
organization (Kohlberg, et al, 1976, p. 32). 
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Thus, Kohlberg's description of development, in terms of transition and 
consolidation addresses the notion of invariant sequence, as well as 
structure d'ensemble. 
Theoretical Conclusions 
According to Kohlberg, stages of moral development are organized 
according to their own logic. They are internally consistent and 
qualitatively different from each other. Individuals use just one 
stage of moral reasoning across most situations unless they are in 
transition, which involves the use of +1 reasoning. Developmental 
progress consists of sequential consolidation of successive stages. 
This sequence is hierarchical and invariant, thus lower levels of moral 
reasoning are no longer used once higher levels ~ave been attained. 
Kohlberg ~as also offered evidence .of naturalism by citing examples of 
all his stages in other cultures. Furthermore, he claims that the same 
invariant sequence has been documented cross-culturally (Kohlberg, 
1969). 
Kohlberg's paradigm is a rigid application of structural develop-
mental theory. Many researchers have attempted to test Kohlberg's 
model with a major emphasis on examining methodological and social 
psychological weaknesses. A brief review of this literature will 
follow. However, the most relevant issues for this study are the 
theoretical underpinnings of Kohlberg1 s model. Thus major theoretical 
notions such as naturalism, invariant sequence, and structured whole 
are examined. at this point. 
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Theoretical Critique 
Many researchers have reviewed the structural aspects of Kohlberg's 
theory (Edwards, 1978; Gibbs, 1977; Holstein, 1976; Kohlberg, 1968; 
Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kuhn (1976); Kurtines & Grief, 
1974; McGeorge, 1974; Siegal, 1980). This has included an examination 
of naturalism, structured whole, and Kohlberg's invariant sequence of 
deve l oprnent •
Naturalism 
Kohlberg (1968) cites cross-cultural evidence for his six stages of 
moral reasoning as well as his sequence of development. He claims to 
have discovered universal moral principles as his theory of development 
pertains to the human species in general. Kohlberg bases these claims 
largely on some unpublished work which he refers to in a 1968 popular 
magazine article. He collected data in America, Taiwan, Mexico, 
Turkey, and Yucatan which showed that 7% of the 16-year-olds in America 
and Mexico used stage six reasoning and 1% or less of a comparable 
Taiwan sample reasoned at this stage. None of the children in either 
Turkey or Yucatan were able to reach even stage five. Thus, stage five 
is missing in two of the five samples and stage six is absent in three 
of the samples. According to Kurtines and Grief (1974) "age trends in 
stage five and six are clearly present only in the United States sample 
-- the same group Kohlberg (1958) used to derive the stages" (p. 461). 
They conclude that there is no evidence to support Kohlberg's claim 
that the course of moral development is universal. 
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Siegal (1980) also reviewed cross-cultural research relevant to 
Kohlberg•s paradigm. He concluded that stage five and six reasoning is 
generally attained only in western 3ocieties, and much of that post 
conventional reasoning can be attributed to scoring error. 
The lack of evidence to support the development of post 
conventional reasoning in members of the same species across cultures 
renders Kohlberg•s claim of universality somewhat questionable. At 
best, no evidence has been shown to document naturalism with respect to 
Kohlberg•s theory<of development. In addition, Siegal (1980) concludes 
that without a sufficiently large sample of persons who reason at 
stages five and six there can be no empirical support upon which to 
base an invariant six stage sequence. 
Invariant Sequence 
The strongest support for an invariant stage sequence is usually 
based on longitudinal research. Three major longitudinal studies have 
attempted to validate Kohlberg1 s sequence of development. 
Kohlberg and Kramer (1969), in their only published longitudinal 
follow up, found that the subjects from Kohlberg1 s 1958 sample showed 
little systematic change in moral reasoning over time, and 20% 
regressed from stages four and five to stage two. Kohlberg explained 
this regression by inventing a new stage which he labeled 48. This 
stage was designed to address the identity crisis which high school 
graduates encounter as they enter college. 
Holstein (1976) conducted a three year longitudinal study, 
collecting data from parents, as well as their sons and daughters who 
were 13-years-old at the first assessment. Holstein found no evidence 
of the stepwise progression described by Kohlberg's theory~ and many of 
her subjects regressed from higher to lower stages across the three 
year period. Also, adults were just as likely to regress as 
adolescents. Even when Holstein used the new controversial stage 4B 
there was still 25% regression from stages four, five and six to stages 
one, two, and three. 
Kuhn (1976) conducted a one year longitudinal study of 50 5-8 year 
olds with assessment at six month intervals. The first assessment 
indicated that equal numbers of subjects regressed and progressed 
slightly. The second assessment reported similar results. Overall 
results from the one year period showed that a total of 32 subjects 
progressed slightly and five subjects regressed. Although only five 
subjects showed regression overall, almost every subject showed both 
progression and regression at some point during the study, with amount 
progressed slightly more than amount regressed. 
Kuhn (1976) and Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) claim that measurement 
error can account for the minor regressions noted in both of their 
studies. I suggest that if measurement error can a.ccount for slight 
regressions then it.must also be credited with the slight progression 
(e.g., none of Kuhn's subjects progressed an entire stage). 
Measurement error in Kuhn's study could have been a major problem 
due to her inappropriate use of global scoring. Global scoring is a 
gross estimate of the individual's stage of reasoning, insensitive to 
small changes in stage usage, thus it is most inappropriate for a one 
year longitudinal study. It is possible that considerably more 
regression occurred in Kuhn's study but it was not documented due to 
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the insensitivity of global scoring. The validity of Kuhn's study is 
questionable. At best, this study provides no evidence for Kohlberg's 
sequence of moral develoi:ment. 
Kohlberg's six stage sequence lacks empirical support. Regression 
was found in all the longitudinal research and no empirical evidence 
has been provided for stages five and six. Many researchers can 
document Kohlberg's early stages but cannot find support for a six 
stage sequence. 
Regression not only represents a violation of Kohlberg's invariant 
sequence, it also violates his sense of structured whole because the 
same subjects are using reasoning from a wide variety of lower stages. 
Structured Whole 
Kohlberg claims that all of his stages are qualitatively different 
modes of thought and individuals are expected to respond in a way which 
is characteristic of their stage, not in some manner more primitive or 
more mature. However, Kohlberg reports that stage responses across all 
nine dilerrmas correlate .31 to .75, with a mean correlation of .51. 
Sanstrock (1975) reports correlations ranging from .19 to .48 with a 
mean of .33. He found that subjects did not respond consistently 
across dilenmas, in tenns of their stage usage, and concluded that 
there is more situational variability in moral judgment than Kohlberg 
assumes. 
McGeorge (1974) noted significant variation between dilerrmas in the 
responses of 40 12-year-old boys and 23 university students (range of 
correlation= .00 to .33). McGeorge suggests that the dilemmas are not 
pure measures of a single aspect of morality as Kohlberg believes. 
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The lack of internal consistency across dilemn~s is another 
violation of Kohlberg's structural theory (structured whole). Other 
violations have also been noted. Regression in longitudinal research, 
for example, is an apparent violation of Kohlberg's invariant 
sequence. In addition, lack of empirical support for post conventional 
reasoning in cross-cultural studies is a violation of the six stage 
model as we 11 as naturalism. In addition to these theoretical 
concerns, researchers have examined a variety of methodological 
considerations with respect to Kohlberg's paradigm. 
Methodological Considerations 
The present study consisted primarily of a theoretical examination, 
contrasting a simple stage versus complex stage approach to understanq-
ing and organizing moral development. Thus, the major emphasis is on a 
review of the theoretical literature. However, numerous studies have 
addressed the Kohlbergian methodology used to gain support for his 
theoretical notions. Therefore, .a brief review of this literature · 
fol lows. 
Some weaknesses in methodology are evident in the process and 
conditions of test administration. When a dilerrma is presented to a 
subject and the subject is having a difficult time making a clear 
judgment, the examiner asks probing questions (Kurtines & Grief, 
1974). The fact that the examiner probes for more information implies 
an inadequate answer. The subject may alter or change his/her answer 
completely in an attempt to satisfy the . examiner. Also, the same 
probing questions are not used in all cases. Since this process has 
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not been standardized, it is doubtful whether the data can be 
conclusively attributed to one specific factor such as moral reasoning. 
It has al so been discovered that testers often f"ind Kohl berg's 
method time consuming (Kurtines & Grief, 1974). As a result these 
testers have not used all the dilemnas in their assessment. This 
creates problens because not all dilemmas are equally effective for 
assessing moral reasoning, and researchers do not always specify which 
dilemnas they use when presenting their data. Since each dilemma is 
des'i gned to assess a specific portion of the overall stage development 
one cannot assume that the dilemmas are interchangeable (Kurtines & 
Grief, 1974). Failure to consistently follow standardized assessment 
means that research results based on Kohlberg's model may have little 
generalizability and cannot be considered supportive of his theory. 
There are also many social psychological ~actors which seriously 
question the validity of research results based on the Kohlbergian 
paradigm. It has been hypothesized that children respond differently 
to young, old, male and female interviewers (Kurtines & Grief, 1974). 
A subject may respond to a dilerrana according to what the subject feels 
the interviewer wants to hear. The interviewer needs to decide, then, 
whether a subject is responding only to the dilerrma or partially to 
personal characteristics of the interviewer. In my view, the examiners 
are not in a position to decide this issue because they are not even 
considering it as a possibility. 
Assuming that the issues concerning test administration and 
interpretation are resolved, there are still problems regarding the 
issue of content validity. The main characters in all the dilemmas are 
male. Kurtines & Grief (1974) have suggested that this creates a role 
expectation bias. Any assumptions about the roles of males or their 
expected behavior could influence the subject's judgments. 
l/ 
A subject can be affected by a dilenma in ways which Kohlberg's 
method of assessment does not measure. For example, the subject may 
lose interest or get bored when responding to unrealistic dilenmas 
(Turiel, 1966). The lack of inmediate relevancy can cause one to rely 
on expedient reasoning, and moral reasoning can be less mature under 
"deindividuating" cir~umstances (Arbuthnot & Andrasik, 1973). 
It is obvious that there are many social psychological factors 
which contribute to an invalid assessment of moral reasoning. These 
factors, however, are not often considered by the evaluator when an 
assessment of moral reasoning is conducted. 
Methodological weaknesses such as unstandardized test 
administration have been discussed. Social psychological problems have 
also been considered in tenns of experimenter, subject and test bias. 
This evidence is important when examining the past research on moral 
develoi:ment which has used Kohlberg's model. 
Theoretical Proposal 
Many researchers have failed to find support for Kohlberg's version 
of structural develoi:mental theory. Specific theoretical problems 
include the lack of evidence for his notion of invariant sequence, 
structured whole, and naturalism. Pure methodological and social 
psychological problems have also been discovered. Rather than 
abandoning the theory completely, I suggest that we re-examine 
Kohlberg's paradign and adapt his approach to account for the 
theoretical and methodological violations described above. 
Content Based Structuralism 
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Kohlberg has attempted to describe the structural nature of moral 
reasoning as it develops in all individuals. The evidence indicates 
that a rigid application of structural theory to the develoJJ11ent of 
reasoning about moral situations in inappropriate. Rest (1979) believes 
that 11no pure direct assessment of cognitive structure exists that is 
unaffected by the specific task, content, and response characteristics 
of the situation" (p. 64). For example, an individual's reasoning 
about interpersonal situations may be more advanced than his/her 
reasoning about labor strikes, due to the personal relevance or the 
individual's experience in this area • • 
The principles of structural developmental theory, then are more 
appropriate once they have been extended to include variation due to 
situational factors. Subjects may still pass through an invariant 
sequence of develoJ:1T1ent with respect to each content, but develoJJ11ental 
progress does not necessarily have to be at the same point with respect 
to all content areas. A structured whole can also be established for 
each individual with respect to various contents. An individual may 
respond with the same type of reasoning to dilemnas of similar content 
but we should not expect this consistency across different contents. In 
addition, substantial evidence of post conventional reasoning should be 
easier to document as modal use of stages five and six (which is Kohl-
berg's standard for judging a person as a post conventional reasoner) 
is not a necessary condition for verification of higher level thought. 
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Rather than assuming that fixed cognitive structures exist within 
individuals, allowing them to act on all moral situations in the same 
way, I suggest that situational factors such as the content of the 
moral dilemna interact with the cognitive structures to create 
different types of reasoning in a variety of situations. Thus, an 
individual who is capable of post conventional reasoning in some 
instances may use a variety of lower level responses in other moral 
situations as development with respect to some contents is more 
advanced than others. Rest (1979) adds, 
A dilermia about mercy killing may evoke different 
organizing structures than a dilenma about 
distribution of wages or civil disobedience. We 
should recognize that assessment is content and method 
specific. A future goal is to identify the various 
attributions of test situations that affect the 
structural organizations of thinking manifested and 
the extent to which each of these attributes affect 
them (p. 68). 
Thus we should expect a full range of stage responses across dilemmas, 
not just the dominant and +1 stage as Kohlberg suggests. In order to 
find results predicted by Kohlberg's structural theory we would need to 
control content and other situational variables for each subject, or 
pretend that .these things do not matter and dismiss the regression and 
other theoretical inconsistencies as measurement error. 
Canplex Stage Model 
The complex stage model (see figure 2) illustrates the extension of 
structural theory to account for the different types of reasoning 
across situations. Rest (1979) suggests that develoJ]Tlent can be 
assessed in terms of probability. Subjects begin by using a type of 
reasoning only in certain instances and move towards solidifying that 
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reasoning and applying it to a wider variety of situations. The 
probability of observing a particular type of reasoning in an 
individual is a function of the degree of solidification. Thus the 
notion that a subject is on a particular stage is wrong. Rather than 
wondering whether a subject is on a·stage or not we should be more 
concerned with the type of situations or conditions which are likely to 
induce individuals to organize their thinking in certain ways. 
Since it is difficult to consider a subject at a particular stage, 
the complex stage model refers to development as the increasing 
probability of using higher stages of reasoning (Rest, 1979). As 
illustrated in figure 2, it is possible to advance in several 
organizations of thinking simultaneously (e.g., moving to advanced 
levels of stage three, moderate levels of stage four, the earliest 
levels of stage five, and decreasing use qf stage two). Rest (1979) 
suggests that qua 1 ity and quantity are important consi derati ens for the 
complex stage model while the simple stage model is concerned only with 
quality. 
The quality is critical in the simple stage modelo 
The issue in question is what stage is being used, not 
how much. The quantitative aspect is irrelevant as it 
is assumed that the individual will use this mode of 
thought all the time (p. 50). 
Kohlberg (1973b) adds, 
quantitative considerations are antithetical to an 
interest in cognitive structures. The structural 
theory does not treat any change as a change in 
structural competence unless the change is evident in 
a qualitatively new pattern of responses (p. 181). 
Rest (1979) argues that we need quantitative as well as qualitative 
des er i ptors • 
We need qualitative descriptors to represent the 
different organizational patterns and we need 
quantitative descriptors to represent the degree to 
which a particular subject is manifesting one or 
another of those patterns (Rest, 1979, p. 54). 
One implication of the complex stage model, then, is that when subjects 
becane capable of higher level thought the lower reasoning is not 
totally abandoned (as proposed by the simple stage model). Subjects 
may prefer to use the higher stages as they become possible but still 
use lower stage reasoning in certain situations (Rest, 1979). 
DeveloJ]Tlent, as described by the complex stage model, is sequential 
as well as hierarchical. Also, the use of post conventional reasoning 
can be more widely found as it is not necessary to use this level 
exclusively before being credited with it, as Kohlberg's model 
assumes. Thus, all the general elements of structural develoJ]Tlental 
theory which were violated in Kohlberg's structuralism are maintained 
by accounting for develoJ]Tlent in terms of the complex stage model. 
The Purpose of the Study 
One purpose of this study was to find additional support for the 
complex stage model by noting the degree of stage mixture across and 
within situations. Another purpose of the study was to explore 
possible factors which could account for this variability in stage 
usage. In addition, I attempted to document substantial evidence of 
post conventional reasoning by using a complex stage orientation in the 
assessment of moral reasoning. I also attempted to gain evidence of 
post conventional thinking, as well as documentation of Kohlberg's six 
stage invariant sequence, by examining the correlation between moral 
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and abstract reasoning. Finally, this study was conducted to explore 
methodological considerations in using Rest's method of assessment. 
For example, Rest claimed to have developed a valid continuous index of 
moral reasoning (P%). This study was designed to examine that claim. 
Moral Judgnent and Abstract Reasoning 
Many researchers have not been able to document Kohlberg's highest 
level of reasoning in their studies. Siegal (1980) concludes that 
there is no empirical support for stages five and six. Gibbs (1977) 
believes that development can only be documented through stage four. 
Kuhn (1976) and Holstein (1976) found longitudinal evidence of 
sequential development through stage three. Kurtines and Grief (1974) 
review Kohlberg1 s (1968) cross-cultural data and conclude that there is 
no evidence to support Kohlberg's claim that the course of moral 
develojl'Tlent is universal, 11age trends in stages five and six are 
clearly present only in the United States sample" (p. 461). While no 
one has been able to provide empirical support for post conventional 
reasoning, most researchers agree that ·there must be more advanced 
reasoning beyond the conventional level. Principles of justice and 
human rights are not reducible to stages three and four (Gibbs, 1977). 
Identifying Post Conventional Reasoners 
Rest (1979) describes some potential assessment problems created by 
using Kohlberg•s interview technique, which may explain why this device 
identifies few post conventional reasoners. 
The clinical interview may underestimate the 
structural competencies of the child. A child is 
credited with having a structure only if he can 
express it, explain it, justify it and sometimes argue 
against alternatives.~ •• A person may be able to 
organize his or her actions and make discriminations 
using a structure without being able to talk about the 
structure (Rest, 1979, p. 60). 
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Development of a concept precedes through a series of steps from 
preference to comprehension and finally verbal justification (Rest, 
1979). Thus, individuals may be understanding and using post 
conventional reasoning before Kohlberg identifies this with his 
assessment device. Also, to be considered a post conventional 
reasoner, Kohlberg's assessment requires one to use this level 
predominantly throughout the assessment. Kohlberg has justified this 
in tenns of the simple stage model (see figure 1). However, the 
complex stage model (see figure 2) describes development more 
adequately as most individuals do not use just one stage of reasoning 
(Rest, 1979). Thus Kohlberg's assessment device may be an 
inappropriate means of identifying post conventional reasoners. 
Therefore, we cannot assLRne that post conventional reasoning is as rare 
as Kohlberg's model suggests. "The post conventional level is reached 
by a minority of adults and is reached only after the age of 20-2511 
(Kohlberg, 1976, p. 48). 
Moral Reasoning and Cognitive DevelOJlTlent 
Attempts have been made to demonstrate construct validity of 
Kohlberg's full six stage sequence by measuring the correlation betwee~ 
moral reasoning and other measu~es of cognitive development. Despite 
the assessment difficulties described above, a few researchers have 
managed to show significant correlations between moral and general 
cognitive development. 
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Whiteman (1964) found that the ability to make more mature morl1 
judgnents increases with I.Q. across three age categories, 7-8, 9-10, 
11-12. Each age category contained a full range of I.Q. scores 
(70-145) thus, Whiteman concluded that maturity of moral judgnent is a 
function of increases in mental age rather than advances in 
chronological age. 
Lee (1971) demonstrated that the structures involved in moral 
judgment developed concomitantly with cognitive structures in general, 
as measured by Piagetian tasks. Lee suggests that this is evidence for 
Piaget's assertion that changes in cognitive structure are essential 
for the development of moral judgment • 
. Tomlinson-Keasy (1974) examined the relationship betwe~n fonnal 
operations and principled moral reasoning, and concluded that there is 
a substantial predictable relationship between fonnal operations and 
principled level reasoning. More specifically, fonnal operational 
thought is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for post 
conventional reasoning (Tomlinson-Keasy, 1974). 
Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, & Haan, (1977) also studied the relation-
ship between formal operational thought and post conventional reasoning. 
However, they also included I.Q. as a variable. Kuhn et al. concluded 
that formal operational thought is a necessary condition for the 
consolidation of conventional moral judgnent. All post conventional 
reasoners had attained formal operational thought and the lower levels 
of moral judgnent correlated with lower levels of perfonnance on fonnal 
operational tasks. The full range of I.Q. scores occurred for all 
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groups, thus Kuhn et al. conclude that the relationship between levels 
of logical and moral development is not a reflection of their common 
relation to I.Q. 
While there is some concentration of higher I. Q. 's at 
the higher logical and moral jud911ent stages there is 
wide variability in I.Q. at each logical-moral level. 
When the mental age variable is completely eliminated, 
in fact, the logical-moral correlation drops only · 
slightly (Kuhn et al, 1977, p. 161). 
Kohlberg (1979) adds "measures of moral judgment correlate with 
measures of moral attitudes, choices, and behavior to an extent not 
accounted for by I.Q. or other pure cognitive variables" (in Rest, 
1979, p. xii). The relationship between I.Q. and moral jud911ent is 
moderate, since moral reasoning is one aspect of intellectual 
development, however, moral jud911ent is distinct from general 
intellectual development as correlations between logical and moral 
reasoning are higher than moral reasoning and I.Q. Kohlberg et al, 
(1976) comment further on this issue. 
Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced 
moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical reason-
ing. A person's logical stage puts a certain ceiling 
on the moral stage he can attain ••• logical development 
precedes moral development. Moral development depends 
upon intellectual development but intellectual develop-
ment does not depend on moral development (pp. 5 and 6). 
The correlations established between measures of cognitive 
development and moral development indicate that higher level moral 
reasoners are more advanced in terms of cognitive development. In 
fact, fonnal operational thought is a necessary condition for post 
conventional reasoning. Thus, higher level moral reasoners (stages 5 
and 6) are distinct from lower level reasoners on a variety of measures 
other than moral reasoning. These distinctions suggest that post 
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conventional resoning is a qualitatively different mode of thinking. 
Thus, the lack of impirical support for stages 5 and 6 is probably a 
function of the inability of Kohlberg's assessment device to identify 
this group, rather than evidence against its existence. 
Correlational studies which attempt to document Kohlberg's sequence 
of develoi:xnent or distinguish post conventional reasoners in tenns of 
other cognitive abilities have provided only limited evidence. This is 
primarily due to their use of Kohlberg's assessment device which is 
based on the simple stage model. The simple stage model limits the 
group of post conventional reasoners to individuals who use this level 
almost all the time. It also asslJTles that all post conventional 
reasoners are at the same develoi:xnental point. Thus, most researchers 
have justified comparisons between groups of reasoners (in the ANOVA 
sense) because they assume that their groups are homogeneous. However, 
the complex stage model assumes no specific stage assigrunents. Instead, 
it proposes a combination of stage usage which is not reducible to a 
single stage. Thus, according to the complex stage model, comparisons 
between groups of reasoners is inappropriate and less meaningful due to 
the inevitable variation within these groups. 
Thus, another purpose of the present study was to find construct 
validity (convergence) for Kohlberg's full six stage sequence by 
meas ur, ng the carrel ati on between abstract reasoning and moral 
judgment. This was an improvement over previous studies seeking the 
same goal as I used the complex stage model to assess moral reasoning, 
rather than previous simple stage approaches, and regression analysis 
was used rather than ANOVA. 
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Research Questions 
A number of questions have been raised in this comparison and 
review of two models of moral development. This study was designed to 
evaluate the following questions. 
1) Can we demonstrate construct validity for Rest's model of moral 
develoJlTlent? la) Can we show external validity for an invariant six 
stage developmental sequence? lb) Can we find evidence of post 
conventional thinking by doctJTienting higher levels of abstract 
reasoning in nonconventional reasoners? 
2) Is there sufficient stage mixture within subjects to warrant a 
complex rather than simple stage orientation? ·2a) Do subjects use a 
variety of stage responses to address different situations? 2b) Do 
subjects use a variety of stage responses to acWress the same situation? 
3) Is post conventional reasoning more prevalent than Kohlberg 
assumes? Can we use the complex stage model to document post conven-
tional thinking which would be missed with a simple stage approach? 
4) What are some of the personal/situational factors which 
contribute to individual variability in reasoning? 
5) What are some of the methodological concerns in implementing the 
complex stage model by using Rest's method of assessment? Sa) Is Rest's 
index of moral reasoning (P%) an adequate continuous measure? 
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Method 
Subjects 
All subjects included in this study were college undergraduate 
volunteers. These volunteers were solicited from introductory 
psychology classes at a rural state university in exchange for research 
course credit. Seventy subjects participated in the first phase of the 
study and 15 of these subjects were used to complete a second phase. 
Measures 
Similarities. A similarities subtest was administered to all 
subjects and used as a measure of abstract reasoning (see appendix A). 
This test consists of 15 items selected from the WAIS (1955) and WISC 
(1949) similarities s.ubtests which are designed to measure abstract 
thinking ability (Kaufman, 1979;.Matarazzo, 1979; Sattler, 1974). 
Accardi ng to Matarazzo (1979_), 
This measures the individual's ability to perceive the 
conman elements of the tenn he is asked to compare 
and, at a higher level, his ability to bring them 
under a single concept (p. 206). 
Most correlational studies show that a well constructed similarities 
test is one of the most reliable measures of intellectual ability, 
however; there are instances where indiviudals do poorly on 
similarities and comparatively better in tenns of I.Q. (Matarazzo, 
1979). This demonstrates that abstract reasoning is only one part of 
I.Q. and is probably more directly related to other forms of reasoning 
such as moral judgment. "Subjects who perform poorly on the 
Similarities test may do so not because of intellectual lack but 
-
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because of an inner need for concretistic thinking" (Matarazzo, 1979, 
p. 490). Thus the similarities test sheds light on the nature of the 
subject's logical thinking process; the degree to which they =an step 
outside the pure physical characteristics and describe functional, 
purposeful, or other abstract conmonality. The WISC and WAIS 
Similarities subtests were combined because neither test contained 
enough difficult items to appropriately challenge the college subject 
population. Items were selected from both tests to increase the 
difficulty, allowing more variance in performance for more meaningful 
correlational results. 
The similarities test was administered in group fashion and scored 
according to the standards described in the WISC (1949) and WAIS (1955) 
manuals. Good responses were given 2 points, fair responses were 
awarded 1 point and poor responses earned no point val.ue. Points were 
sunmed across the 15 items to yield a total .score. Standardized 
instructions for dealing with confusing responses include a request for 
clarification posed by the examiner, however, that was not part of the 
procedure in this study due to the limitations of group administration. 
Instead a method of interpolation which is commonly used in scoring 
standardized measures (e.g., Vineland Social Maturity Scale, 1965) was 
used. For example, when a confusing response (see appendix A) fell 
within a string of 0 point responses it was scored as 0. If it fell 
within a string of 1 or 2 point responses it was scored as 1. When it 
fell after a string of 1 or 2 point responses but was preceded by a 0 
point response it was scored as 1/2 point. 
General information. All subjects completed a test of general 
informtion (see appendix B). This test consists of items selected from 
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the WAIS (1955) and WISC (1949) infonnation subtests which are designed 
to measure acquired general knowledge (Kaufman, 1979; Matarazzo, 1979; 
Sattler, 1974). It was administered j n group fashion and scored 
according to the standards described in the WISC (1949) and WAIS (1955) 
manuals. Good responses were given 1 point and poor responses were 
awarded no point value. Partial credit of 1/2 point was given when a 
portion of the answer was correct. Points were summed across the 10 
items to yield a total score. 
Defining issues test (DIT). The DIT is a measure of moral 
preference designed by Rest (1979) (see appendix C). After subjects 
read through a moral situation they are expected to rate and rank a 
number of concerns and questions in terms of their relative importance 
in making a decision about what ought to be done. Item selection on 
the DIT is largely governed by two ?recesses, the ability to comprehend 
an item and the sense of an item's conceptual adequacy (Lawrence, 1978). 
The items on the DIT were selected from issues and concerns raised 
by subjects while they were being evaluated by Kohlberg's moral judgment 
interview. Typical stage responses given by subjects during interviews 
were extracted from Kohlberg's research transcripts. These stage 
responses were transcribed and placed as response choices on the DIT. 
All items are matched by word length, syntactic complexity, and use of 
technical or specialized terminology (Rest, 1979). 
Internal consistency and reliability are reported on various DIT 
scoring methods. The P index refers to the percent of post convention-
al reasoning used by the subject throughout the DIT. The P index is 
derived in the following way. 1) Each of the subject's four choices to 
any one dilerrma is differentially weighted. The first is weighted 4 
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points, second choice 3 points, third choice 2 points, and the last 
choice is weighted 1 point. 2) The weight is then multiplied times the 
stage rating of the response. 3) These products are sunmed by stage so 
that each stage has some numerical value. 4) These values are divided 
by the total possible point value, to obtain individual stage percent-
ages. 5) To derive P%, the percentage values for stages 5 and 6 are 
summed. 
The T score (also known as Kohlberg's Moral Maturity Score) was 
also used in this study, although no psychometric data exist on this 
measure. This score is derived in similar fashion to the P%. 
Following step 4, the stage percentages are multiplied times the stage 
number to yield a series of stage products. These products are suromed 
across all stages to form the T score. 
Rest. (1979) reports DIT test - retest rel i abi 1 ity in the range of 
.70-.80, and internal consistency of .77. Measures of convergent 
validity have also been reported (Rest, 1979). The DIT correlates with 
measures of moral comprehension .49-.65 and Kohlberg's measrue of moral 
judgment .40-.70. Correlations between the DIT and I.Q. are 
approximately .36, general aptitude .40, and tests of personality 
.25-.35. In general, the DIT correlates best with other measures of 
moral develoJJTlent, moderately with measures of general intellectual 
development, and poorly with measures of personality. Since moral 
reasoning is pres1J11ed to be one aspect of general cognitive develoJJTlent 
we would expect moderate correlations with I.Q. However, the higher 
correlations with other measures of moral reasoning show that the DIT 
"is a distinct aspect of intellectual develoJJTlent and not simply the 
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application of general .cognitive and linguistic skills to moral content" 
(Rest, 1979, p. 147). 
The P% is the most common score reported by researchers using the 
DIT and its viability rests on the major assumptions of the complex 
stage model described earlier. Individual stage score percentages are 
also reported in Rest's DIT scoring system. The test-retest reliability 
of the P index ranges from .71-.82 and internal consistency is .77. 
The test-retest reliability of stage score percentages range from 
.so~.so with an internal consistency of .28-.60. 
The DIT protocols used in this study were scored according to the 
system described above and in Rest (1979). This system produces a P 
index as well as stage percentages. 
Structured interview. The structured interview was designed to 
explore personal/situational factors which could account for the low 
internal consistency in stage responses across dilemmas as measured by 
the DIT. The questions differed for each subject, since it was 
unlikely that subjects would generate identical DIT response patterns. 
However, the purpose and fonnat of the interview_ remained constant. 
The following four steps represent a model approach to the structured 
i ntervi ~-
1) Subjects were given 5-10 minutes to review their protocol. This 
not only provided subjects with an opportunity to refresh their memory, 
it also -gave them a chance to re-evaluate their choices. 
2) Following the review period two or three dilenmas were chosen 
for further discussion. This choice was based on the subject's use of 
different stage responses across the different moral situations. The 
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purpose of step two was to generate discussion within each of the 
situations (comparisons across situations was the focus of step three). 
This step served as a means of clarifying the subject I s reasoning as · .:-' 
well as determining; a) if the subject really understood the dilemma, 
b) if their answer truly represents their reasoning, c) if they under-
stood and rejected other stages of reasoning, and d) the situational 
factors which led to the rejection of higher and lower level 
reasoning. The following example is a model of this step. 
In the Heinz story you said that a "-husband's love for 
his wife" was more important than "upholding the 
conmunity' s 1 aws". What are the key issues in your 
opinion? How important is it to consider whether the 
druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and 
cruel? How does the law enter into a situation like 
this? 
3) Following within situation exploration, a contrast across 
situations was. conducted. This gave subjects an opportunity to justify . 
their inconsistency in level of reasoning in terms of personal/-
situational factors. The following is an example of this step. 
Why is it important to uphold the law in the case of 
the escaped prisoner but acceptable to break the law 
and steal the drug in the Heinz situation? 
4) This fourth step consisted of a series of additional questions 
which were designed to address situational factors. They were posed in 
a more general manner, asking subjects to conment on the experience of 
taking the DIT and comparing it to their own life experience. The 
following sample questions were characteristic of this step. 
Considering all six situations, which ones did you 
feel -most and least comfortable about answering? Why? 
Which of your responses are you most and 1 east 
satisfied with? Why? 
Did any of these situations make you feel stressful or 
remind you of a real life experience which was 
stressful? 
Which situations had issues which were most ann least 
meaningful? Why? 
Have you ever experienced a moral situation similar to 
the ones you have been asked to respond to? 
The structured interview was conducted on an individual basis 
lasting about 45 minutes. 
Procedure 
Seventy subjects were administered the DIT, Similarities, and 
General Information in group fashion. This required approximately 50 
minutes to complete. Specific instructions for completing this package 
are contained within the instrument, however, subjects were told: 
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how 
people think about social problems. Different people 
have different opinions about right and wrong thus 
these problems have no absolutely right answer. 
Please answer all questions as completely as possible 
and expect to comp1 ete everything in approximately 50 
minutes. 
Inter-scorer reliability. The measur.es of abstract reasoning 
(Similarities) and general knowledge (General Information) were scored 
by two psychology graduate students. A sample of 29 protocols was 
selected at random, from the total sample of 70, to establish 
reliability coefficients. The inter-scorer reliability on the 
Similarities measure was .971 and the reliability on the General 
Information measure was .944. This level of agreement between scorers 
suggests that the 29 protocols were scored accurately and it increases 
our confidence in the scores of the remaining sample. Table 1 displays 
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the means, standard deviations, and ranges of scores obtained by both 
scorers on each measure (N = 29), as .well as summary statistics for the 
entire sample (N = 70). The simi l arity between the statistics in the 
reliability sample and the total sample indicates that the sample 
selected for establishing scorer reliability is truly representative of 
the total sample. 
The DIT was scored according to the procedure described earlier. 
Fifteen subjects, who appeared to exhibit the greatest amount of incon-
sistency in their stage responses across the six moral dilenmas, were 
selected for the structured interview. • 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics For Reliability And Total Sample 
Standard Smallest Largest 
Mean Deviation Value Value 
Similarities l* (N = 29) 16.44 4.064 8.0 24.0 
Similarities 21:'k (N = 29) 16.09 3.787 8.0 23.0 
S imil ari ti es 
entire sample (N = 70) 16.02 4.21 6.0 27.0 
General 
Inf onnati on l* (N = 29) 3.76 1.33~~ 1.0 6.0 
';_.~ _-,. \ 
General 
I nf onn at i on 21:'k (N = 29) 3. 72 1.327 1.0 6.5 
General 
Inf onnati on 
entire sample (N = 70) 4.01 1. 72 1.0 6. 5. 
P% (N = 70) 39.171 12.081 11.0 69.0 
T score (N = 70) 376. 343 42.308 248.0 466.0 
Note. * scorer one 
** scorer two 
The structured interview was conducted on an individual basis 
lasting about 45 minutes. The infonnation was recorded by the 
interviewer in the fonn of written transcripts and later surrmarized in 
terms of the situational factors which seemed to account for the 
disparity in reasoning. 
Subjects were thanked for their participation and any questions 
were answered regarding the purpose of the study. 
Results and Discussion 
The following section will include an analysis and discussion of 
the correlational data (abstract and moral reasoning). Consistency in 
reasoning across and within different moral situations will also be 
explored and Rest's technique of indexing moral reasoning will be 
examined. In addition, the prevalence of post conventional reasoning 
will be evaluated to provide additional support for Kohlberg's full six 
stage model. Finally, the results of the structured interview will be 
presented to address situational variation in tenns of personal/ 
situational factors as well as methodological considerations. 
Correlational Data 
Zero order correlations. Can we demonstrate construct validity for 
Rest's model of moral develoJJJ1ent? Can we find external validity for 
an invariant six stage developmental sequence? Can we find evidence of 
post conventional thinking by docLITlenting higher levels of abstract 
reasoning in nonconventional reasoners? I suggested that there would 
be a significant correlation between logical and moral reasoning. 
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Table 2 shows that this hypothesis was not supported as the correlation 
between similarities and P% was .194 (F = 1.62, d.f. = 1/67, p > .05, 
n.s.), and the correlation between Similarities and T score was .136 
(F = 1.26, df. = 1/67, p > .05, n.s.). The General Information Score, 
however, correlated significantly with moral reasoning (P% general 
knowledge= .338, F = 8.6~, df. = 1/67, p <.01, sig; T score, general 
knowledge = .273, F = 5.39, df. = 1/67, p < .05, sig; R2 P% • Simila-
rities, general knowledge= .126, F = 4.84, df. = 2/67, p ~ .05, sig.). 
Partial and semi-partial correlations. Previous research has 
demonstrated a direct relationship between levels of logical and moral 
thought, not accounted for by I.Q. (Kohlberg, 1979; Kuhn, 1977). The 
limitation of previous research is the use of a simple stage model 
which leads to violations of homogeneity. In the present study I 
proposed that the correlation between abstract and mor.al reasoning 
would be significant following statistical control of general 
knowledge. Also, the unique contribution of general knowledge to the 
index of prediction would be nonsignificant. The figures in Table 3 
indicate that neither hypothesis was supported (correlation between P% 
and Similarities ~ith the General Information score partialled out= 
.116, F = .93, df. = 1/68, p > .05, ns; semi-partial correlation 
between P% and General Information= .297, F = 6.785, df. = 1/67, p < 
.05 sig.) In addition, we can see from the table that Similarities 
adds no significant unique information to our prediction, and the 
variance shared by moral reasoning and General Information remains 
significant after the contribution of logical reasoning is partialled 
out. Similar results are obtained using the T score as a dependent 
measure. 
Table 2 
Zero Order Correlations Between Dependent Measures P% and T score 
and Independent Measures Similarities and General Infonnation 
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General 
P% 
T score 
S imil ari ti es 
General Infonnation 
Note. * p < .05 
** p <:: .01 
N = 70 
1.00 
T score 
.8051'rlr 
1.00 
Table 3 
Similarites Inf onnati on 
.194 .338-H-
.136 .273* 
1.00 .263* 
1.00 
Partial' and Semi-Partial Correlations Between Dependent Measures 
P% and T score and Independent Measures Similarities and 
General Infonnation 
Simi 1 ariti es 
(1) 
General Inf onnati on 
(1) 
Note. * p ( .05 
- N = 70 
P% 
rp1-• 2 = .116 
rP(l 0 2) = .108 
rP2 ·1 = .303* 
rP(2 ·1) = .297 
T score 
rr1 • 2 = .069 
rT(l 0 2) = .067 
rr2·1 = .247* 
rT(2·1) = .246* 
'1-U 
The poor correlation between measures of moral reasoning and 
Similarities (abstract logical reasoning) could be due to a variety of 
factors such as: poor measurement properties of th~ Similarities test, 
poor psychometric properties of the Defining Issues Test ·, subject 
response characteristics not measurable with the DIT fonnat, or marked 
departure from the important assumption of linearity. 
The Similarities test was constructed from items which comprise 
similarities subtests on the WAIS (1955) and WISC (1949). These 
subtests are proven effective measures of abstract logical thinking 
(Kaufman, 1979; Matarazzo, 1979; Sattler, 1974). However, since I did 
not use either subtest in its entirety it would have been useful to 
establish a correlation between my new Similarities measure and the 
standardized version. Otherwise I cannot assume that my measure has 
identical psychometric properties. It was necessary to alter the 
standardized measure to create a more difficult test which could 
generate a greater level of variability in the college population. The 
fonnat of my Similarities test however, was identical to the 
standardized version and the few items which were substituted came 
unchanged from another standardized version. Therefore, even though we 
cannot be positive that the two measures are effectively evaluating the 
same thinging skills, we can be fairly confident that my measure has 
.. 
construct validity and the low correlations reported earlier are 
probably not due to poor psychometric properties of the experimental 
Similarities measure. 
The low correlations may also be due to an ineffective dependent 
measure. The psychometric properties of the DIT reported earlier are 
fair at best. In addition, the present study revealed numerous 
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measurement problems ranging from content and response bias to 
inadequate indexing procedures. The results and discussion of this 
analysis will be presented in more detail later in this paper. Briefly 
stated, however, the P% does not hold up as a valid indexing procedure, 
not all dilemnas are capable of inducing thoughtful consideration of 
responses, the "meaningless" items do not distinguish high and low 
level reasoners as they were intended, the wording and presentation of 
items is confusing, and an individual's choice of response does not 
always represent his/her reasoning capacity. Since the DIT is 
psychometrically questionable at best we cannot expect meaningful 
correlational data when it is used as a dependent measure. 
The poor correlations could be due to a particular response 
characteristic not appropriately assessed by the DIT. The structured 
interview revealed that subjects who were capable of understanding and 
using higher level thought did not always select the high level 
responses. They recognized, for example, that principles were . 
important but found legitimate reasons for ranking consequences as more 
important. Thus, some individuals who were high level moral reasoners, 
and probably scored high on the measure of abstract thinking, were 
labeled .by the DIT as lower level reasoners. Therefore, their high 
Similarities scores correlated poorly with their low DIT ratings. We 
cannot assume that a subject's multiple choice selection represents 
reasoning capacity in most instances, therefore the use of DIT 
information is limited in correlational research. 
The low correlations may have been due to a marked departure from 
the important assumption of linearity. That is, the relationship 
between moral and abstract reasoning may not be linear. This means 
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that while moral and abstract reasoning may correlate moderately 
considering the full range of both constructs, the relationship may not 
hold up when we use just one portion of this range. This study, for 
example used a group of abstract reasoners which fall in the middle to 
high range of the construct. The relationship between moral and 
abstract reasoning may be different for this group than for the 
construct as a whole. To truly test the relationship between moral and 
abstract reasoning we should have included the full range of abstract 
and moral reasoners. 
The most stable factor in the correlational aspect of the study was 
a weak, though significant, correlation between the General Information 
measure and DIT score. One possible explanation for this result could 
be that individuals who have more general knowledge have had a greater 
range of experience to develop this knowledge. This broader range of 
general experience may also include greater experience in processing 
moral situations. 
Due to the psychometric properties of the instruments involved, 
however, we must assume that the constructs .proposed for correlation 
were measured only to a limited degree. Their relationship remains 
largely unknown. Before these relationships can be validly established 
a number of issues need to be addressed. When using measures of moral 
reasoning one needs to recognize the discrepancy between capacity and 
perfonnance and decide upon which aspect it is most appropriate to 
focus. We need a more valid measure of the construct before we use 
moral reasoning in any meaningful research. Also, no one has ever used -
an established standardized measure of abstract reasoning in their 
correlational research. When referring to a construct such as abstra~t 
logical ·reasoning we need to become more operational in terms of 
description as well as measurenent before designing proposals and 
making generalizations. 
Simple and Complex Stage Models 
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Is there sufficient stage mixture within subjects to warrant a 
complex rather than simple stage orientation? There are a variety of 
difficulties in defining the construct of moral reasoning. One issue 
is the design of an appropriate model of organization. Within structur-
al theory alone, for example, there is little agreement regarding the 
process of moral development. Some conceptualize development as 
discrete steps while others believe that it is a continuous progression. 
Some theorists focus strictly on qualitative change while others look 
for quantitative change.s. F.urthermore, some believe that individuals 
can be adequately described with a single stage label while others 
suggest that some rating of stage mixture is most appropriate. These 
major theoretical issues have been contrasted as the simple versus 
complex stage models. 
Reasoning across situations. Do subjects use a variety of stage 
responses to address different situations? It was proposed that indiv~-
duals would use different types of reasoning in response to different 
situations. In keeping with the complex stage model I expected stage 
mixture across situations to cover the full range fo~ each individual, 
rather than only adjacent stage usage as the simple stage model sug-
gests. To illustrate this point most dramatically only the subject's 
first choice responses to each of the six stories were considered. 
Table 4 shows that no one responded with the same stage across all 
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stories and only four subjects (6%, N = 70) responded within the same 
level (two adjacent stages). Many subjects spanned all five stages 
(39%) with their six first choice responses, and 77% of the subjects 
spanned four or ~ive stages. The mean number of stages spanned was 4.2 
out of 5. This suggests that individuals use a full range of reasoning 
to respond to different situations, thus it is inappropriate to label 
them in terms of any one stage. 
Table 4 
Stages Spanned When Reasoning Across Dilemmas 
Stages Spanned Across Number Percentage 
Six Stories (using only Of Of 
first choice responses) Subjects Subjects 
1 0 0 
2 4 6% 
3 11 16% 
4 27 38% 
5 28 39% 
Note. X stages spanned= 4.2 
N = 70 
As Rest (1979) suggests, the notion that a subject is on a stage is 
wrong. Individuals continue to use lower stage reasoning long after 
they are capable of higher level thought. 
Stage mixture is one explanation for the regression noted 
previously in longitudinal research. Rather than interpret regression 
as evidence contrary to the invariant developmental sequence we can 
think of it as selective use of alternative forms of reasoning • . Since 
individuals do not discontinue their use of lower level reasoning wher, 
they become capable of higher level thought we should expect them to 
utilize seemingly 11regressed 11 reasoning occasionally. Rather than 
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taking just two measures (before and after) to docl.Dllent longitudinal 
change it seems more appropriate to take several measures before and 
after to detennine changes in tenns of probability of stage usage. 
Development coulq then be considered the increasing probability of 
using higher level thought. This conclusion would not be altered 
drastically by a few cases of lower stage usage following the 
longitudinal period, which is evidently what has happened in previous 
studies enploying the simple stage model. 
Another implication of stage mixture concerns moral education 
programs. Turiel (1966) has done extensive research to determine the 
most productive means of facilitating moral growth. His general 
conclusions suggest that; 1) cognitive moral conflict is a necessary 
condition for moral growth and 2) moral discussions where subjects are 
presented with reasoning which is 1/3 .to 1 stage higher than their own 
stage is a most effective means of inducing cognitive moral conflict. 
This "+P approach has been worked into educational curriculums. 
However, given the complex stage model and the evidence presented in 
th~s study, we would be hard pressed to identify anyone in terms of a 
particular stage. Thus, which stage do we use for the +1 reference 
when an individual uses stages 2 through 5? The +1 approach to 
promoting moral growth, then, not only becomes impractical but also 
theoretically impossible. 
The infonnation on stage mixture suggests that assessing moral 
reasoning is not as simple a task as once assLJT1ed. When a single stage 
rating is assigned to individuals based on their answers to a few moral 
stories, we are discarding valuable infonnation in the interest of 
simplicity and losing sight of the true purpose of our investigation. 
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Reasoning within situations. Do subjects use a variety of stage 
responses to address each situation? The complex stage model predicts 
that individuals will use a full range of reasoning when responding to 
moral dilenmas, as different situations are capable of inducing 
different levels of thought, and personal characteristics of the 
reasoner interact with specific features of the dilemma. Subjects may 
use a variety of stage responses regardless of the personal/situation 
factor. The current study provides an opportunity to examine this 
question. To obtain this comparison we treated each dilenma ,as a unit 
and established a measure of consistency within the dilemma. Since 70 
subjects responded to six dilenmas we had a slrriple of 420 dilemnas to 
examine. We measured consistency by considering the number of stages 
spanned by the four responses within each dilenma. Table 5 shows that 
only one dilerrana (.4%) was answered with four responses at the same 
stage. Most dilenrnas contained responses which spanned four or five 
stages ( 65%). 
Table 5 
Stages Spanned When Reasoning Within Dilenmas, 
Considering All Four Choices 
Stages Spanned Number Of Percentage 
Within Dilenma Subjects Of Subjects 
1 1 .4% 
2 33 8% 
3 111 26% 
4 164 39% 
5 111 26% 
-Note. X stages spanned= 3.8 
N = 420 
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Since the Defining Issues Test is a forced choice multiple selection 
survey, some subjects may have chosen responses unrepresentative of 
their reasoning because they were required to make a choice even though 
there were not enough reasonable answers provided at their stage. 
Thus, the stages spanned within dilernna was calculated using only the 
first two responses chosen for each situation. Table 6 shows that 
subjects are more consistent in their first two choices, however, there 
is still a large amount of variability. The mean stages spanned was 
2.6 with 22% of the stories involving a span of four to five stages. 
Table 6 
Stages Spanned When Reasoning Within Dilenmas, 
Considering Only Two Choices 
Stages Spanned Number Of Percentage 
Within Dilermia Subjects Of Subjects 
1 85 20% 
2 140 33% 
3 103 24% 
4 57 14% 
5 35 8% 
-Note. X stages spanned= 2.6 
N = 420 
Again, this makes it difficult to assign a single stage rating even 
when using just one dilemna. Assigning a single stage rating or 
expecting subjects to justify their answers with reasoning on just one 
stage is unrealistic. An individual's decision about whether or not to 
steal a drug to save a life may be based on principles, as well as 
laws, and consequences or personal gain. The individual who can 
consider and integrate all three levels of thought may be more 
successful than someone who narrowly focuses on only one level. 
Kohlberg's simple stage approach forces the data into artificial 
simplicity. 
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The data sunmarized within and across situations suggests that 
reasoning is not consistent within the one or two stage framework 
proposed by the simple stage model. The across situation variability 
indicates that subjects respond differently to different situations. 
The within situation variability suggests that although subjects are 
more consistent within situations, the situational factor cannot 
account for all the variability. Evidently subjects draw from a 
variety of different levels of thought in an attempt to address each 
dil anma most adequately. 
Post conventional reasoning. 
prevalent than Kohlberg assUT1es? 
Is post conventional reasoning more 
Can we use the complex stage 
orientation to document post conventio~al thinking which would be 
missed with a simple stage approach? The fact that subjects draw from 
a variety of different levels of thought as they address moral dilemmas 
implies considerable use of post conventional reasoning. Many 
researchers have questioned Kohlberg's six stage model because evidence 
is lacking for stages 5 and 6. Another purpose of this study was to 
substantiate Kohlberg's full six stage model by documenting evidence of 
post conventional reasoning in terms of the complex stage model. 
According to the simple stage model and Koh.lberg's scoring methods, 
individuals are required to use post conventional reasoning 
predominantly throughout the assessment before they can be considered 
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post conventional reasoners. This creates a problem as only a rare 
sample of people fit these restricted qualifications. It is not 
necessary to find pure post conventional reasoners before we can report 
that post conventional reasoning is being used, especially in view of 
the stage mixture evidence presented earlier. In fact, we should not 
expect examples of any pure stage reasoners (individuals using the same 
stage of reasoning 100% of the time). 
Evidence of post conventional reasoning was found in 100% of the 
sample. In fact, individuals used stages 5 and 6 an average of 39.17% 
of the time. However, none of the subjects in the study would have 
been considered post conventional reasoners by Kohlberg•s standards 
(i.e., global or moral maturity score). The complex stage model allows 
documentation of the six stage develoJJT1ental sequence, in tenns of 
increasing probability of higher stage usage, long befc~e an individual 
reaches a point of exclusive stage 6 usage. 
Empirical results have shown that moral reasoning does not exist in 
pure stage form. Thus we can accept that post conventional reasoning 
is being used even though no one would be labeled as a post conventional 
reasoner according to Kohlberg•s standards. 
The implications of this conclusion are especially important for 
cross-cultural studies. Researchers have failed to find evidence of 
post conventional reasoning in other cultures. This may be due 
primarily to their dependence on the simple stage model. Individuals 
may understand and be capable of post conventional thinking but choose 
not to practice this level of reasoning because it has no relevance in 
their society. Also, post conventional reasoning may be used in part 
to address moral issues but it does not exist in pure form so people 
50 
are not credited with this level of sophistication~ Studies have not 
addressed the issue of preference versus capacity with respect to moral 
reasoning, and cross cultural studies hav.e not been conducted based on 
the complex stage model. We need to direct ourselves to these issues 
before we make ·conclusions about the reasoning capacity of people in 
other cultures. 
The complex stage model seems to be the most adequate way of 
organizing and understanding moral develoJJT)ent because of its 
flexibility in considering personal and situational factors. However, 
Rest and others do little more than propose the model and mention that 
their data seem to fit a complex pattern. This does not explain why 
data patterns are complex. 
Structured Interview, Results 
What are some of the personal/situational factors which contribute 
to individual variability in reasoning? The structured interview was 
designed to explore possible explanations for situational variation in 
reasoning. In addition, it also revealed many methodological 
considerations regarding the validity of the DIT. 
The results presented in this section will address two major issues: 
1) does the DIT accurately evaluate an individual's reasoning? If not, 
what are s001e of the methodological considerations? 2) what are some of 
the persona 1/si tuat i onal factors 1 eadi ng to variation in reasoning 
across dilenmas? The results of the structured interview will be 
presented on a case by case basis, using the subject's initials to 
identify each case. 
-
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L.M. Accuracy. In the "Heinz" story L.M. chose a stage 2 answer 
and defended it with stage 2 and 4 reasoning "I think of myself before 
anyone else ••• is it really worth the risk of getting shot just to save 
someone else? ••• you have to put yourself first in those situations." 
When pressed further, L.M. responded "under no circumstances would I 
steal. •• stealing is wrong." 
In the "Prisoner" story L.M. chose an anarchistic response which 
was scored as stage 2. However, her justification of this answer was 
on a principled level "I guess I would approach him first (before 
deciding to turn him in) ••• he would have to demonstrate to me that he 
could make a worthwhile contribution to society again." 
In the "Doctor" story L.M. chose a stage six response and defended 
it with stage six and two reasoning "People should be allowed to make 
their own pecision about living and dying •• • there should not be a law 
about it because no one has a right to tell someone when they can live 
and die ••• you have got to think of yourself." 
The three dilemmas chosen for follow up discussion were largely 
accurate indicators of L.M.'s true reasoning. However, L.M. remarked 
that "most of the questions seemed ambiguous and a little confusing." 
This is another source of measurement error. 
Personal/situational factors. The varying level of consequence 
across stories influenced L.M. to attend to them in some instances and 
overlook them in others. The severity of the consequences also 
affected the difficulty of the dilemma "the doctor dilerrma was the 
hardest for me because the stakes were high ••. the Heinz story was 
easiest because it seemed more clear cut. I've always been brought up 
to believe that stealing is wrong." Thus, personal experience and 
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severity o~ consequences were two factors· contributing to variation in 
reasoning. 
J.D. Accuracy. In the "Heinz" story J.D. chose a "meaningless" 
response and justified it with principled level reasoning "life is more 
important than laws and getting in trouble ••• no matter who is dying." 
In the 11Newspaper11 story J.D. chose a stage 3 response and 
justified it with principles and purposes "student's rights are 
important ••• if they had good intentions and some important issues to 
write about then the paper should be allowed to continue." 
In the "Doctor" story J.D. chose a stage 5 response and justified 
it with stages 4 and 2 _reasoning 11I would gain some kind of legal 
permission ••• there is a pretty heavy penalty for killing someone." 
None of the dilenmas chosen for further discussion was an accurate 
measure of J.D. 's reasoning. In addition, the ·11meaningless 11 response 
did not serve its purpose as J.D. attributed a meaning to this answer 
which would have been scored as stage 6. 
Personal/situational factors. The varying level of consequences 
across stories was a factor influencing J.D.'s reasoning. J.D. 
remarked II the consequences for stea 1 i ng are nothing next to what would 
probably happen if you murdered someone." J.D. also mentioned that the 
dilemnas varied in their ability to engage the reader 11some stories 
seemed more realistic, more vivid, and easier to imagine or get 
involved with." Thus, severity of consequence, interest level, and 
realistic nature of the story were all factors contributing to response 
variation. 
L.W. Accuracy. In the "Webster" story L.W. chose a stage 4 answer 
and defended it with stage 5 and 6 reasoning 11he should hire the best 
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mechanic and laws or races should have nothing to do with it ••• he 
should hire the individual for his abilities ••• laws are designed to 
guarantee freedom to all, if this is not working what is the point of 
the 1 aw?" 
In the "Student take-over" story L.W. chose a stage 4 answer and 
defended it with stage 5 and 6 reasoning 111 don't believe that anyone 
has the right to exercise their rights when they infringe on others ••• 
in the long run this approach will not benefit society as a whole, just 
individual small groups. If it meant saving lives I would probably 
break the 1 aw •11 
In the "Newspaper" story L .W. chose a stage 6 response and 
justified it with stage 5 and 6 reasoning "I think freedom of speech is 
critical. This public discussion is where a lot of learning about real 
issues takes place." 
L.W. was consistent in her reasoning across situations but the DIT 
did not evaluate her this way. In most cases L.W. had some higher 
level rationale for choosing a lower level response. Evidently some 
DIT responses are not understood in the same way by all subjects. The 
DIT, however, makes no distinction between the more sophisticated and 
less capable person's version of the same response. 
Personal/situational factors. While there was actually little 
variation in reasoning across situations, L.W. mentioned that some 
di l ernmas were more difficult to answer than others "the social 
decisions were easier to answer than the personal issues. Making 
decisions for large groups seems less personal and easier to detach 
from. 11 
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A.A. Accuracy. In the "Heinz" story A.A. chose a stage 2 response 
and justified it with stage 3 reasoning "I guess I would end up taking 
the drug ••• I'd probably do just about anything for my famiiy. 11 She 
also had some meaning for the meaningless response which matched her 
own level of reasoning. When the people involved in the story are not 
direct family members A.A. falls back to a consequence, personal gain 
orientation 11it just isn't worth the risk ••• you've got to think of 
yourself you know.11 A.A. had a difficult time imagining some 
situati ens because of the lack of personal concrete experience II its 
to save his wife so no one will look down on him ••• he should consider 
the consequences of losing his wife versus going to jail." 
In the 11Student take-over" story D.B. chose a stage 4 response .and 
justified it with stage 2 and 3 reasoning "the president has been 
around, he's experienced ••• he is the authority •11 
In the 11Doctor11 story D.B. selected a stage 6 response and 
justified it with principled level reasoning "her life is her 
responsibility, it is her own decision ••• the doctor is there to save 
1 i ves and make people more comfortable but ultimately it is her 
decision." 
Personal/situational factors. The ~Student take-over 11 was more 
meaningful for D.B. because of personal experienc~. D.B. has already 
thought a great deal about these issues thus his answers seemed more 
practical than his responses to other stories. 
A.V. Accuracy. In the 11Heinz11 story A.V. chose a stage 2 answer 
and justified it with stage 2 and 3 reasoning 11even if the 1aw isn't 
right you need to abide by it ••• if you get caught you must pay the 
consequences.11 
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In the "Prisoner" story A.V. chose a stage 4 answer and justified 
it with stage 5 reasoning "the severity of the crime makes a difference 
••• the particular crime is a more tnportant factor than the law." This 
person was able to consider individual circumstances and the purpose 
behind the law in a way not measured by her selection of a stage 4 
response. • 
In the "Doctor" story A. V. chose a stage 4 response and justified 
it with stage 5 reasoning "its her decision, she should know best, its 
her body and human life is more important than laws ••• law doesn't take 
into consideration special circumstances." 
While the DIT was a little more accurate in evaluating A.V. the 
overall DIT rating was still an underestimate of A. V. 's actual level of 
reasoning. Some of this may be due to structural properties of DIT. 
A.V. conmented that the ans~ers were not phrased clearly and it was not 
clear whose point of view one should be answering from. She also 
discovered that occasionally her preferred response to a story was not 
listed among the options. 
Personal/situational factors. A.V. noticed that "in the "Heinz" 
story only two people are affected but in the "Prisoner" story many 
people are." When thinking in terms of society the consequences were 
not as important for A. V. as when dealing with a personal situation. 
A.V. also mentioned that the most difficult dilemmas to decide were the 
ones dealing with life and death. Evidently the various stories 
induced different kinds of thinking for A.V., depending on the personal 
nature of the story and the extent to which it dealt with life or death. 
N.M. Accuracy. In the "Heinz" story N.M. chose a "meaningless" 
response and justified it with stage 5 and 6 reasoning. "Laws should 
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not get in the _way of principles ••• laws are ~ot .imnutable ••• there are 
circumstances under which it is o.k. to break the law." Evidently this 
11meaningless 11,.answer had considerable meaning for N.M. Again, these 
meaningless items are not serving their purpose of separating high and 
low level reasoners. They are not identifying "fakers", which was 
their original purpose. 
In the 11Newspaper11 story N.M. chose another "meaningless" response 
and justified it with principled level reasoning "the points of view of 
everyone should be considered in making the most equitable choice." 
In the "Student take-over" story N.M. chose a stage 4 response and 
justified it with principled level reasoning "the ROTC should not be 
disbanded based on the needs of just a few students, you should really 
consider the rights of al 1 •11 
The DIT was particularly inaccurate in this case due to the 
i neff ecti veness of "meaningless" responses. Even though they are 
supposed to be identifying low. level reasoners who fake a high answer, 
there seem to be just as many high level reasoners choosing these 
answers. 
Personal/situational factors. Personal experience played a role in 
the decision making "I have no real life experiences to help me answer 
the Heinz and Protest stories, but my high-school experience working on 
a newspaper helped me decide about that story. 11 
M.M. Accuracy. In the "Heinz" story'M.M. chose a stage 2 response 
and justified it with stage 2 reasoning. An important aspect of M.M.'s 
answer was the recognition that laws and personal obligations were 
important considerations but "the most important thing to consider is 
whether I live or die" (consequences for getting caught). M.M. said 
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that she would steal the drug only if she knew she was not going to be 
caught. 
In the "Doctor" story M.M. chose a stage 3 answer and justified it 
with stage 3 reasoning "only God should decide." 
In the "Webster" story M.M. chose a stage 4 answer and justified it 
with stage 5 reasoning 11I would hire him as his talent as a mechanic is 
the most important consideration ••• he deserves a job, if his customers 
don't like it they can go elsewhere." 
With the exception of the last story the DIT was accurate in 
assessing this individual. However, this subject got little credit for 
laws and personal obligations even though they were relatively important 
for her. This infonnation was discovered during the follow up 
discussion but was not indicated by the DIT because thought process is 
not scored. 
Personal/situational factors. M.M. mentioned that consequences 
were more or less important depending on their severity "running a red 
light may be worth the risk but getting shot is not." Also, previous 
experience in a philosophy class helped her sort out the issues in the 
"Doctor" dilenma. Thus, previous experience and varying severity of 
consequence were two factors contributing to the variability in 
reasoning across situations. 
A.R. Accuracy. In the 11Heinz11 story A.R. chose a "meaningless" 
response and justified it with a law and order rationale, mixed with 
personal gain (stages 2 and 3) "stealing is wrong ••• it isn't going to 
help him." 
___ ,L. ___________________________________ __,.,,_..1.-__ .. 
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In the "Doctor" story A.R. chose a stage 3 answer and justified it 
with stage 3 reasoning "Its God I s res pons i bi l ity not the family's or 
the doctor I s. 11 
In the 11Newspaper11 story A.R. chose a stage 6 answer and justified 
it with a principled level response. In general the DIT was fairly 
accurate in assessing A.R. Unfortunately no interview information was 
provided to explain her variability in reasoning across situations 
(consequences in some instances and principles in other cases.) 
V.S. Accuracy. In the "Student take-over 11 story V.S. chose a 
stage 2 answer and justified it with a principled level response "the 
principle behind the movement is more important than the law.11 
In the 11Newspaper11 story V .S. chose a stage 3 answer and justified 
it with a principled level response "the general principle of freedom 
of speech is most important. 11 
In the "Webster" story V.S. chose a stage 5 response and justified 
it with a principled approach "everyone is equal. •• laws are irrelevant 
to the issue. 11 
In most cases V.S. understood the lower level responses in higer 
level tenns. The DIT has no provision for this kind of thinking. 
Rather, the DIT assumes that everyone will understand an answer for the 
meaning it was intended to convey, given the individual's capacity to 
reason on that level. 
Personal/situational factors. V.S. has encountered many of the 
same issues of protest and equal rights in his own personal experience, 
thus these issues have the most meaning for him. This made a difference 
in how he was able to get involved in the story and generate meaningful 
answers. 
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S.M. Accuracy. In the "Student take-over" story S.M. chose a 
stage 2 answer and justified it with a stage 5 response "personal 
beliefs are the motivating factor ••• they are more important than laws 
or consequences." S.M. also mentioned that she had not given the 
stories much thought, they were not able to stimulate her involvement. 
In the "Prisoner" story S.M. chose a stage 3 answer and justified 
it with a stage 5 response "he should be evaluated as a person and a 
judgment should be made depending on the situation ••• only then can the 
best dee i si on for him and society be made. 11 
In the "Doctor" story S.M. chose a stage 5 answer and justified it 
with a stage 3 response "God has the ultimate authority." 
In all instances S.M. changed her point of view during the 
interview from her original feelings at the time she took the DIT. 
This was mainly due to her more thorough examination of the situations. 
The DIT, in its original fonnat, was not capable of stimulating an 
intense level of thought in the case of S.M. 
Personal/situational factors. The major situational factor was 
thought provoking ability of the dilenma. As stories were able to 
induce more intense thinking, S.M.'s reasoning expanded to include more 
encompassing principles~ Also her uncle recently became terminally ill 
so she has very strong feelings on this issue . 
Structured Interview, General Discussion 
Personal/situational factors. Personal experience and severity of 
consequence were the two most co!TITion factors contri bl'ting to variation 
in response level across situations. 
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Most subjects noticed that the severity of consequences were 
different across stories. They al so reported that this influenced 
their choice of response "the ·consequences for stealing are nothing 
next to what would happen if you ki 11 ed someone. 11 Most i ndi vi duals 
admitted that consequences played some role in their decision, 
regardless of t~eir overall level of reasoning. When consequences were 
less severe they co~ld more easily be placed on low priority. Thus, an 
individual's choice of consequence level reasoning is not purely a 
function of reasoning capacity, but also situational denands. We could 
probably create situations which would influence the highest level 
reasoner to focus on consequences or level I responses. This is not as 
much an indication of low level reasoning as much as it may be a 
measure of adaption. An individual who is able to understand 
principles, laws, and co.nsequences, and can select the most appropriate 
levels to address the specific situation, is showing signs of adaption 
not measured by the DIT. There is no provision to distinguish this 
person, when they select level I reasoning, from the individual who can 
only reason on a consequence level. 
Subjects also reported that their own personal experience affected 
their response to the DIT II I've been through that with my grandfather, 
that made a lasting impression on me.... It made it much easier to put 
myself into the situatioffl •.• it makes more sense to me.11 The personal 
relevance factor made the dilemma clearer and easier to understand. In 
addition, having dealt thoroughly with these issues in the past, 
subject's answers were more organized and well thought out. Also, as 
dilemmas were more personally relevant subjects showed more interest 
and were better able to remember story details. 
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Memory and interest level also affected reasoning in dilemnas that 
were not personally relevant. Subjects reported that some stories were 
more thoJght provoking than others. As dilemmas seemed uninteresting 
or difficult to imagine subjects became expedient in their approach to 
the task. They changed their answers during the follow up interview 
and admitted that they had previously not given the story much 
thought. Thus, reasoning is variable across situations as these 
situations vary in their ability to induce deeper level thought. 
Subjects also reported varying difficulty imagining themselves as the 
main characters in the dilermnas. 
The results from the-structured interview suggest that individual 
variation in reasoning across situations was due partially to severity 
of consequence, personal relevance, thought provoking ability of the 
qilenma, and egocentrism in unrealistic situations. Thus measuring 
moral reasoning is even more complex than the complex stage model 
ass1JT1es. Since an assessment procedure has not been designed to 
accommodate these personal/situational factors, we are without a 
measure of moral reasoning capacity that can accurately describe an 
individual's thought processes. 
Methodological considerations. What are some of the methodological 
concerns in using Rest's method of assessment? In addition to 
personal/situational factors, the present study showed that numerous 
methodological factors also contribute to response variation. One of 
these factors is P%, Rest's index of moral reasoning. 
Rest (1979) suggests that the variability in stage usage can be 
thought of in terms of overlapping probability curves, each curve 
representing a different stage. Rest's complex stage model gives us a 
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continuous measure of moral reasoning (P%) which is supposed to 
describe individuals in terms of these complex stage patterns. This 
means that we should be able to describe individuals in terms of their 
lower stage usage based on their P%. 
Is Rest's index of moral reasoning an adequate continuous measure? 
I attempted to validate the P% by examining the relationship between P% 
and lower stage patterns. This was accomplished by using the T score ,. 
'(also known as Kohlberg's moral maturity score). This is a total 
measure of stage usage, principled and lower. The T score is a sum of 
stage products. A product consists of the stage used times the 
percentage it was used. If stage patterns were similar for individuals 
with the same P%, then the correlation between T score and P% would 
have been nearly perfect. However, rP%T score= .80, thus the scores 
share only 64% conmen variance • . The two scores are calculated from 
some of the same information as they both use percentages of stage five 
and six responses. Since the average P% is 39.2%, the P% and T score 
share about 40% of the variance just by virtue of calculation method. 
Also, an average of 8% of the subject's responses were meaningless 
answers which have no influence on either score. Thus, 48% of the 
variance is either control led or removed. The 64% total conman 
variance, then, is less than impressive. Thus, P% is not a good 
continuous measure since individuals with the same P% do not have 
similar lower stage patterns. We cannot accurately describe moral 
reasoning in terms of P% alone. Without an adequate continous measure 
we cannot expect meaningful correlational data. The theory proposed by 
Rest and supported in this study indicates that moral development is a 
continuous rather than discrete construct. Due to Kohlberg's simple 
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stage orientation he does not adequately address stage mixture. Rest 
claimed to have developed an index to measure this stage mixture. 
Evidently his measure is also inadequate. Kohlberg and Rest both 
discard large amounts of information without sufficient justification. 
Neither theorist has an adequate measure of the construct moral 
reasoning. 
Without an adequate measure of moral reasoning the implications for 
research and practical interventions are distressing. For example, 
when organizing groups for different experimental treatments we cannot 
assume homogeneity based on P%. A 1 so, we cannot accurately measure 
change over time with P% because many changes in lower stage usage 
could occur and go unnoticed. Finally, it is difficult to prescribe 
individual educational interventions when individuals cannot be 
adequately described in terms of the trait of interest. For example, 
Turiel's (1966) +1 approach of facilitating moral growth is useless 
without an adequate means of measuring an individual's baseline level 
of reasoning. 
The stage mixture documented in this study makes it difficult to 
measure and describe i ndi vi duals in terms of moral reasoning. Even 
though an adequate continuous measure has not been designed, I am 
confident that it is most appropriate to organize the construct in 
continuous rather than discrete fashion. For example, this helps up 
explain the regression in reasoning which is found in longitudinal 
research based on the discrete model. Thus, the notion of invariant 
sequential develoi:ment is preserved with the continuous model. 
Another source of methodological difficulty involves the 
"meani ngl ess 11 responses on the DIT. These items are syntactically 
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complex and designed to-be totally meaningless. Their purpose is to 
identify those individuals who do not understand higher level reasoning 
but choose complex answers in an attempt to fake high. 
The most common response choice on the "Heinz" story was one of the 
"meaningless" items. Fifty-six percent of the subjects chose a 
I 
"meaningless" response as one of their first or second answers to this 
dilemna. However, equal numbers of high and low level reasoners 
answered with this response. The mean P% in the college population was 
39.2. Nineteen subjects who chose a meaningless response to the 
"Heinz" story had a P% greater than 39.2, and the remaining twenty 
meaningless responders had a P% below 39.2. Furthennore, most subjects 
had some sensible meaning for this response which was consistent with 
their other answers. 
Considering meaningless responses across all dilemmas, 83% of the 
subjects selected at least one "meaningless" response. These subjects 
were also divided equally in terms of high and low level reasoners. 
Thus, these meaningless items serve no useful function. They work 
poorly as an identification of subjects faking high, introducing more 
error to a psychcmetrically questionable instrument. Also, since they 
have no point value they significantly reduce the person's total score. 
Subjects also reported that response choices were not phrased 
clearly. The accuracy results reported earlier indicate that subjects 
justified their response choice with a different stage of reasoning 25 
out of 34 times (73%). In addition, there was no systematic or 
consistent direction of error in tenns of always justifying with a 
higher or lower stage response. Much of this inaccuracy may be due to 
the poor phrasing or ambiguous nature of the response choices. 
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Another critical measurement issue is the subject's varying 
interpretation of the same response choice. There were many instances 
of subjects choosing the same response and justify •ing it with very 
different reasoning. A stage 4 response choice, then, could be 
understood two differ.ent ways by individuals using stage 2 and stage 6. 
However, once the response has been chosen, the individual is labeled 
by the stage rating it represents regardless of the reasoning 
involved. This is another explanation of the poor correlational data 
reported earlier. As subjects are incorrectly labeled we cannot expect 
meaningful correlations. 
Subjects were also incorrectly labeled as low level reasoners when 
they understood yet placed principles on low priority. The structured 
interview revealed that some reasoners who understood principles, and 
used them in other situations occasionally, .chose lower level responses 
to address some situations more adequately. These reasoners are given 
a low rating as if they are not capable of principled level thought. 
The DIT cannot distinguish between this individual and one who can only 
reason at a lower level. 
The structured interview revealed that the psychometric properties 
of the DIT are questionable at best. Meaningless answers do not serve 
their purpose, there is no control for interest level, and many items 
are difficult to understand due to awkward wording. Expediency is 
promoted in some individuals due to the length and unrealistic nature 
of the dilenmas. Forced choice responding creates errors as there are 
not enough adequate answers at each stage, and the reasoning behind the 
choice does not always match the reasoning intended by the authors of 
the DIT. Severity of consequence and personal relevance create 
66 
variation in response choice across situations. Menory for story 
details is also influenced by personal relevance, and the dilemnas vary 
in their ability to stimulate thoughtful consideration for different 
subjects. In general, variability in reasoning is to be expected due 
to numerous measurement issues as well as personal/situational factors. 
Summary 
This review and comparison of a simple and complex stage model has 
addressed a variety of questions and concerns. For example, I 
attempted to show a significant positive correlation between moral and 
abstract reasoning using a complex stage orientation. However, the 
correlation between moral and abstract reasoning was not significant. 
This could have been cue to poor measurement properties of my test of 
abstract reasoning. However, it is more likely that the poor psycho-
metric properties of the DIT were a major factor. Before we can expect 
meaningful research results we need to design a more valid measure of 
moral reasoning. 
This study also contrasted the simple and complex stage model by 
noting stage mixture across and within situatio~s. The degree of stage 
mixture documented in this study indicates that a simple stage approach 
is an inappropriate way to classify or organize moral reasoning. 
College age individuals use a full range of reasoning to respond to 
different situations, rather than the dominant and +1 reasoning 
suggestesd by the simple stage model. Since it is inappropriate to 
label anyone in terms of a single stage, much of the research and many 
of the educational programs based on this model must be questioned. 
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Another purpose of this study was to doclJllent Kohl berg's full six 
stage sequence, particularly stages 5 and 6. Can we use the complex 
stage model to document post conventional thinking which would be 
missed with a simple stage approach? I found evidence of post 
conventional reasoning in 100% of the sample. The complex stage model 
permitted documentation of the six stage developmental sequence, in 
terms of increasing probabilities of higher stage usage, long before 
simple stage criteria could have been met. Thus, post conventional 
reasoning is not as rare as Kohlberg suggests. 
This study was also designed to explore personal/situational 
factors which contribute to inconsistency in moral reasoning. Two 
personal/situational factors were discovered to be common to most 
subjects examined in this study: personal exerience and severity of 
consequence influenced the ,response choice of many subjects. 
Since not all dilenmas are equal with respect to severity of 
consequences, according to complex stage model, variation in reasoning 
is inevitable on the Kohlberg or Rest measure of moral reasoning. 
Subjects reported that consequences played a role in most of their 
decisions, regardless of their overall level of reasoning, and they 
were able to disregard them to the extent that their severity was 
minimal. None of the major assessment devices are designed to 
accommodate this situational factor. 
Subjects also reported that their personal experience affected 
their response to the dilemmas. They were able to organize their 
answers, attend more to the details, and remember these "personal 11 
dilemnas with greater accuracy. Since assessment devices are not 
prepared to consider the role of .personal/situational factors we cannot 
be sure that these instrl.lJlents are effectively measuring moral 
reasoning capacity. 
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I proposed that variation in reasoning would be due largely to 
personal/situational factors. The across situation variability 
supports this hypothesis, however, the situationaJ factor does not 
account for all the variability. Subjects were more consistent within 
each situation than across situation, though their within-dilemma 
reasoning still included a great variety of stage responses. Evidently 
subjects draw from a variety of different levels of thought in order to 
most adequately address each moral situation. 
Finally, this study was concerned with methodological considerations 
in using Rest's method of assessment. I discovered that methodological 
concerns further cloud the issue of assessment • 
. Subjects justified their response choice (DIT) with a different 
stage of reasoning (structured interview) 73% of the time. This 
inaccuracy· could have been due to a variety of factors. For example, 
the 11meaningless11 items on the DIT were largely a source .of error. 
Response choices were not phrased clearly. Also, different subjects 
often interpreted the same response choice in terms of a different 
stage of reasoning. In other words, the selection of a stage 4 answer 
by a particular subject tells us very littlre about that person's level 
of moral reasoning. 
Other methodological problems were also documented. Subj~cts 
responded expediently to dilerrrnas of low interest, hence their answers 
did not represent their true reasoning capacity. Also, there were not 
enough adequate answers at each stage so some subjects were forced to 
make a choice which was not representative of their true thinking. 
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In general, the psychometric properties of the DIT are questionable 
at best. This is not only important in terms of future research in the 
area of moral develolJTlent but we must also question past research which 
has been based on this assessment device. 
One of the most problematic issues in moral develolJTlent research is 
finding an adequate index of measurement. One of the major 
methodological questions addressed in this study was: Is Rest's index 
of moral reasoning (P%) an adequate continuous measure? The complex 
stage model is appealing because it does not label subjects in terms of 
a single stage. This study revealed, though, that the index of 
measurement used by the complex stage model (P%) is inadequate. 
Without a good measure of moral reasoning it is difficult to conduct 
meaningful research or design appropriate educational programs. 
The construct of moral reasoning is more complex than the DIT and 
other assessment devices are prepared to handle. We have yet to 
discover an appropriate means to measure the construct. The results 
presented in this study indicate that a complex stage orientation is 
the most appropriate way to understand moral develoJJ11ent. However, we 
need to achieve the same level of sophistication with respect to 
assessment that has been achieved in terms of theory. The problem 
remains to create a method of assessment which can fully acconmodate 
all the implications of a complex stage model. 
Appendix A: 
SIMILARITIES 
Directions: Please answer the following items by explaining how 
they are alike or similar. 
Example A: 
Example B: 
Cat - Mouse 
best response: 
fair response: 
poor response: 
confusing response: 
Orange - Banana 
best response: 
fair response: 
poor response: 
confusing response: 
both are an ima 1 s 
both have tails and fur 
they chase each other 
they eat the same food 
both ·are fruit 
both have peels 
both are good for you 
they tastse the same 
Provide your best response in the space below the word pair. Remember 
to explain how the two items are similar, not how they are different. 
1. Piano - Violin 
2. North - West 
3. Air - Water 
4. Pound - Yard 
5. Mountain - Lake 
6. Scissors - Copper Pan 
7. Egg - Seed 
8. First - Last 
9. Poem - Statue 
10. Wood - Alcohol 
11. Praise - Punishment 
12. Liberty - Justice 
13. Fly - Tree 
14. Salt - Water 
15. The Numbers 49 and 121 
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Appendix B: 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Directions: Please answer these questions of general infonnation 
in the space provided next to each item. 
1. How far is it from 
Paris to New York? 
2. Who discovered the 
South Pole? 
3. What is the capitol of 
Greece? 
4. What does C.0.0. mean? 
5. From what source do we 
get turpentine? 
6. How does yeast cause 
dough to rise? 
7. What is the population 
of the United States? 
8. How many senators are there 
in the United States Senate? 
9. What is the main theme of 
the Book of Genesis? 
10. What is ethnology? 
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Appendix C: 
OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about 
social problems. Different people often have different opinions about 
quest i ,)ns of right and wrong. There are no 11ri ght11 answers in the way 
that there are right answers to math problems. We would like you to -
tell us what you think about several problem stories. The papers will 
be fed to a computer to find the average for the whole group, and no 
one will see your individual answers. 
Please give us the following information: 
Name ----------------------
Age 
•School 
Cl ass and period ---- ------------
---------------
female --
male --
* * * * * * 
In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your op1n1ons about 
several stories. Here is a story as an example. Read it, then turn to 
the next page. 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, 
has two sma 11 children and earns an average income. The car he buys 
will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work 
and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In 
trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there were 
a lot of questions to consider. On the next page there is a list of 
some of these questions. 
If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these 
questions be in deciding what car to buy? 
PART A. (SAMPLE) 
On the left hand side of the page check one of the spaces by each 
question that could be considered. 
PART B. (Sample) 
1. Whether the car dealer was in the same 
block as where Frank lives. 
2. Would a used car be more economical in t he 
1 ong run than a ~ car. 
3. Whether the color was green, Frank's 
favorite col or. 
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at 
least 200. 
5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a 
compact car. 
6. Whether the front connibilies were 
differential. 
From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the 
whole group. Put the number of the most important question on the top 
line below. Do likewise for your 2nd, 3rd, and 4th most important 
choices . 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
5 
2 
3 
1 
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HEINZ AND THE DRUG 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There 
was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a fonn of 
radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The 
drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what 
the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for 
-
a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to 
everyone he knew to _borrow the money, but he could only get together 
about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that 
his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay 
later. But the druggist said, 11No, I discovered the drug and I'm going 
to make money from it. 11 So Heinz got desperate and began t O¥think about 
l, 
breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one) 
Should steal it 
Can't decide 
Shou.ld not steal it 
HEINZ STORY 
On the left hand side of the page 
check one of the spaces by each 
question to indicate its importance. 
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care 
so much for his wife that he'd steal? 
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar 
or going to jail for the chance that stealing the 
drug might help? 
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has 
considerable influence with professional 
wrestlers. 
5. Whether Heinz·is stealing for himself or doing 
this solely to help someone else. 
6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention 
have to be respected. · 
7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing 
than the termination of dying, socially and 
individually. 
8. What values are going to be the basis for 
governing how people act towards each other. 
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to 
hide behind a worthless law which only protects 
the rich anyhow. 
_____ 10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of any member of society. 
_____ 11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for 
being so greedy and cruel. 
_____ 12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more 
total good for the whole society or not. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
STUDENT TAKE-OVER 
At Harvard University a group of students, called the . Students for a 
Democratic Society (SOS), believe that the University should not have an 
army ROTC program. SDS students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the 
army training program helps send men to fight in Viet Nam. The SOS 
students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC training program as a 
university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get 
army training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for 
it towards their degrees. 
Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end 
the ROTC program as a university course. But the President of the 
University stated that he wanted to keep the army program on campus as a 
·course. The SDS students felt that the President was not going to pay 
attention to the faculty vote or to their demands. 
So, one day last April, two hundred SDS students walked into the 
university's administration bui 1 ding, and told everyone else to get out. 
They said they were doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army 
training program as a course. 
Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Check 
one) 
__ Yes, they should take it over 
Can I t decide --
-- No, they should not take it over 
{C 
1. Are the students doing this to really help 
other people or are they doing it for kicks. 
2. Do the students have any right to take over 
property that doesn't belong to them. 
3. Do the students realize that they might be 
arrested and fined, and even expelled from 
school. 
4. Would taking over the building in the long run 
benefit more people to a greater extent. 
5. Whether the president stayed within the limits 
of his authority in ignoring the faculty vote. 
6. Will the takeover anger the public and give 
all students a bad name. 
7. Is taking over a building consistent with 
principles of justice. 
8. Would allowing one student take-over encourage 
many other student take-overs. 
9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding 
on himself by being so unreasonable and 
uncooperative. 
10. Whether running the university ought to be in 
the hands of a few administrators or in the 
hands of all the people. 
11. Are the students .following principles which 
they believe are above the law. 
12. Whether or not university decisions ought to 
be respected by students. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
I I , 
ESCAPED PRISONER 
A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, 
however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, 
and took on the name of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and 
gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair 
to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his 
own profits to charity. Then one day Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, 
recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, 
and whcm the police had been looking for. 
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent 
back to prison? (Check one) 
__ Should report him 
Can't decide --
-- Should not report him 
78 
- - ·- 79 
ESCAPED PRISONER 
1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such 
a long time to prove he isn't a bad person? 
2. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a 
crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime? 
3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and 
the oppression of our legal system? 
4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to 
society? 
5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson 
sould fairly expect? 
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from 
society, especially for a charitable man? 
7. How could ·anyone be so .cruel and heartless as 
to send Mr. Thompson to prison? 
8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had 
to serve out their full sentences if 
Mr. Thompson was let off? 
9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson? 
10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an 
escaped criminal, regardless of the 
circumstances? 
11. How would the will of the people and the 
public good best be served? 
12. Would going to prison do any good for 
Mr. Thompson or protect anybody? 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
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NEWSPAPER 
Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed 
newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He 
wanted to speak out against the war in Viet Nam and to speak out against 
some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long 
hair. 
When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for 
permission. The principal said it would be all right if before every 
publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal 's 
approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The 
principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper 
in the next two weeks. 
But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would 
receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that 
they began to organize protests agains the hair regulation and other 
school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned 
the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should 
not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal 
ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave a reason that Fred's activities 
were disruptive to the operation of the school. 
Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one) 
__ Should stop it 
Can't decide --
-- Should not stop it 
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__ --~ 1. Is the principal more responsible to students or to 
parents? 
-----
---------
2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper 
could be published for a long time, or did he just 
promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time? 
3. Would the students start protesting even more if the 
principal stopped the newspaper? 
4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does 
the principal ·have the right to give orders to 
students? 
5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say 
"no" in this case? 
6. If the pr inc i pal stopped the news paper wou 1 d he be 
preventing full discussion of important problems? 
7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose 
faith in the principal? 
8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and 
patriotic to his country. 
9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the 
student's education in critical thinking and 
judgment? 
_____ 10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of 
others in publishing his own opinions. 
_____ 11. Whether the principal should be influenced by sane 
angry parents when it is the principal that knows 
best what is going ·on in the school. 
_____ 12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up 
hatred and discontent. 
Fran the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
WEBSTER 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted 
to hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to 
find. The only person he found who seemed to be a_good mechanic was 
Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn't have 
anything against orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many 
of his customers didn't like orientals. His customers might take their 
business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station. 
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster 
said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really 
had not hired anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good 
mechanic besides Mr. Lee. 
What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one) 
Should have hired Mr. Lee --
Can't decide --
Should not have hired him --
-----
2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial 
discrimination in hiring for jobs. 
3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against 
orientals himself or whether he means nothing 
personal in refusing the job. 
4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying 
attention to his custaners' wishes would be best 
for his business. 
5. What individual differences ought to be relevant 
in deciding how society's roles are filled? 
6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic 
system ought to be completely abandoned. 
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7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster's society 
feel like his customers or are a majority against 
prejudice? 
8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use 
talents that would otherwise be lost to society. 
9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent 
with Mro Webster's own moral beliefs? 
10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse 
the job, knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee? 
_____ 11. Whether the Christian corrmandment to love your 
fellow man applies to this case. 
_____ 12. If someone's in need, shouldn't he be helped 
regardless of what you get back from him? 
Fran the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
THE DOCTOR Is DILEMMA 
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only 
about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak 
that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. 
She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, 
she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She 
said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few 
months anyway. 
What should the doctor do? (Check one) 
04 
__ He should give the lady an overdose 
that wi 11 make her die 
Can't decide --
-- Should not give her an overdose 
-----
DOCTOR 
1. Whether the woman's family is in favor of 
giving her the overdose or not. 
2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as 
everybody else if giving an overdose would be 
the same as killing her. 
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3. Whether people would be much better off 
without society regimenting their lives and 
even their deaths. 
4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like 
an ace i dent. · 
5. Does the state have the right to force 
continued existence on those who don't want to 
live. 
6. What is the value of death prior to society's 
perspective on personal values. 
7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman I s 
suffering or cares more about what society 
might think. 
8. Is helping to end another's life ever a 
responsible act of cooperation. 
9. Whether only God should decide when a person's 
life should end. 
10. What values the doctor has set for himself in 
his own personal code of behavior. 
11. Can society afford to let anybody end their 
lives when they want to. 
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing 
and still protect the lives of individuals who 
want to 1 i ve. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important. 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
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